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Abstract
Green et al. (1998) [Green, D., Jacowitz, K.E., Kahneman, D., McFadden, D., 1998. Referendum
contigent valuation, anchoring, and willingness to pay for public goods. Resource and Energy
Economics 20 (2), 85-116] show theoretically that stated preference questions about public services can
be framed in such ways that if the subjects accept the frame the payoff-maximizing behavior will be to
answer truthfully. One key element of such a theoretically incentive-compatible framing is that the
(hypothetical) decision rule specified in the survey instrument is understood to be a majority rule rather
than the efficiency rule typically used in cost-benefit analysis. We conducted field experiments in
Germany and Switzerland to test if a referendum framing as suggested by Green et al. is effective in
reducing strategic misrepresentation in a contingent valuation setting. We did not find the expected
effects of the framing treatments on stated willingness to pay or on individuals' (stated) beliefs about the
social choice context. The results do not support hopes that a theoretically incentive compatible framing
could be purposefully used to invoke the specific beliefs about the linkage between responses and policy
implementation that would make stated preference questions incentive compatible.
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Abstract 
Green et al. [1998, Resource and Energy Economics 20, 85–116] show theoretically that stated 
preference questions about public services can be framed in such ways that if the subjects accept 
the frame the payoff-maximizing behavior will be to answer truthfully. One key element of such 
a theoretically incentive-compatible framing is that the (hypothetical) decision rule specified in 
the survey instrument is understood to be a majority rule rather than the efficiency rule typically 
used in cost-benefit analysis. We conducted field experiments in Germany and Switzerland to 
test if a referendum framing as suggested by Green et al. is effective in reducing strategic 
misrepresentation in a contingent valuation setting. We did not find the expected effects of the 
framing treatments on stated willingness to pay or on individuals’ (stated) beliefs about the 
social choice context. The results do not support hopes that a theoretically incentive compatible 
framing could be purposefully used to invoke the specific beliefs about the linkage between 
responses and policy implementation that would make stated preference questions incentive 
compatible. 
 
Keywords: Contingent valuation; beliefs; incentives; majority rule; public goods; stated 
preferences. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
Unresolved incentive compatibility issues are an important weakness in the theoretical 
underpinnings of the contingent valuation method. In 1993, the NOAA Panel on Contingent 
Valuation recommended the use of a hypothetical referendum question format in surveys 
designed to estimate losses associated with natural resource damage (Arrow et al. 1993). A 
hypothetical referendum question asks, for example, “If your personal tax cost for program A 
were $D per year, would you vote for the program?” The panel recommended the hypothetical 
referendum format, because, “[...] as far as strategic reasons go, a respondent who would not be 
willing to pay D dollars has no reason to answer ‘Yes’, and a respondent who would be willing 
to pay D dollars has no reason to answer ‘No’” (p. 4606). Contingent valuation (CV) questions 
posed in a referendum format with a tax as the (hypothetical) payment mechanism are widely 
perceived as incentive compatible by CV researchers today (Hoehn & Randall, 1987; Mitchell & 
Carson, 1989; Arrow et al., 1993; Hanemann, 1994; Carson et al., 2000; Taylor et al., 2001; 
Champ et al., 2002; Horowitz & McConnell, 2002). Only few authors have noted the panel’s 
mistake (e.g. Diamond & Hausman, 1994; Fisher, 1996; Green et al., 1998; Posovac, 1998; 
Burton et al., 2003). Fisher (1996), for instance, notes that “[...] the case for closed-ended CV 
responses being free of strategic bias has not been made either in theory or by empirical 
findings” (p.26). Green et al. (1998) find “[...] that patterns of response to open-ended and 
referendum questions that are often taken as evidence of incentive-induced misrepresentation are 
in fact present in situations where there are no economic incentives” (p. 95). Unfortunately, the 
CV studies comparing responses to open-ended vs. dichotomous choice questions do not directly 
address the incentive compatibility issue, since potential effects of the question format on 
incentives cannot be distinguished from other potential effects of the question format (e.g. 
Brown et al., 1998).  
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 Previous designed experiments on public good provision and incentives have been 
conducted in laboratory settings (Andreoni, 1988; Andreoni & McGuire, 1993; Cummings et al., 
1995; Burton et al., 2003). Experiments have demonstrated that in early rounds, subjects do not 
free-ride to the extent predicted by theory. In later rounds, free-riding becomes prevalent. These 
laboratory studies used private goods or (group) donations and, therefore, did not need to worry 
about the issues that come into play when stated preferences for collectively provided public 
services are concerned. The incentive properties in private good choices and also in group 
donation decisions (Cummings et al., 1997) do not depend on the complex linkages between the 
responses, outcomes and division of costs which complicate individual decision making in a 
social choice context. In particular, stated preference elicitation in a social choice context must 
take into account that respondents may not always accept (believe) the social choice framework 
as posited in a survey.  
Green et al. (1998) find that – if a CV experiment can be set up in such ways that an 
economically rational subject believes there is a positive probability of being decisive – it is 
possible to frame the elicitation such that if the subject accepts the frame the pay-off maximizing 
response will be to answer truthfully. However, the authors emphasize that subjects may hold 
beliefs about the social choice context that induce misrepresentation, because of a particular 
framing or in spite of it. The paper by Green et al. (1998) is to our knowledge the first to fully 
identify the elements of the posited social choice framework – or more precisely, the respondent 
beliefs concerning these elements – which jointly determine the incentive properties of 
preference elicitation for collectively provided public services1. These elements concern the 
decisiveness of the response, the decision rule, the payment vehicle and the uncertainty about 
actual costs, as detailed in the following section. The aim of the present study is to test the 
                                                 
1 Riera (2003), in turn, is the first to present a systematic theoretical treatment of incentive properties of various 
stated preference methods and question formats, although (as Riera admits) the study does not consider important 
issues concerning respondents’ perception of the relevant social choice framework. Riera’s perhaps most important 
theoretical result is that, if a set of general assumptions about the social choice framework hold, the median-rule 
open-ended CV format is incentive compatible. This result is consistent with the conclusions of Green et al. (1998). 
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 empirical relevance of Green et al.’s theoretical results regarding the role of these elements for 
the incentive properties of preference elicitation in a field setting. Our strategy is to design a field 
experiment in which the important elements of the survey frame identified by Green et al. (1998) 
can be manipulated individually. We then test how these manipulations affect both stated beliefs 
and willingness-to-pay (WTP) responses. 
We asked the following specific questions: (1) How do specifications of the survey frame 
concerning (i) majority vs. mean rule, (ii) cost uncertainty, and (iii) decisiveness of the survey 
affect (a) beliefs about the social choice context and (b) stated WTP. Since cultural differences 
may affect the attitudes to valuation surveys (e.g. Loomis et al. 2002) we conducted these tests in 
two locations with different political institutions and cultures. 
The remaining paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the conceptual framework. 
Sections 3 and 4 contain the method and results. Sections 5 and 6 present the discussion and 
conclusions. 
 
 
2. Conceptual framework 
 
Whether CV respondents think and act strategically is an empirical question (Cummings 
et al., 1995, 1997). There are several reasons why strategic misrepresentation could be 
quantitatively unimportant in standard referendum CV surveys applied to collectively provided 
public goods (Smith 1979). First, subjects confronted with referendum-format questions may not 
perceive their strategic opportunities. Second, subjects may be influenced by norms that prevent 
them from misrepresentation (Green et al. 1998, p. 91). Third, individuals may simply believe 
that their response is inconsequential. However, based on theoretical grounds, more general 
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 claims that the CV referendum protocol is incentive compatible are misleading (Green et al., 
1998; Riera, 2003; Burton et al. 2003). 
In the following, we will call a social choice framework posited in the survey protocol 
(hereafter for simplicity also called the “frame”) “theoretically incentive compatible” (TIC) if the 
payoff-maximizing response of a rational respondent who accepts this frame is to answer 
truthfully.2 Following Green et al. (1998, p. 92) a TIC frame would comprise the following 
elements:  
(1) decisiveness: the response affects the probability of implementation;  
(2) decision rule: the probability of implementation is proportional to the survey plurality 
for the policy, given a pre-specified distribution of the costs; 
(3) payment vehicle: the payment vehicle is ‘decoupled’ implying that the costs will be 
distributed across tax payers by a formula that does not depend on the response;  
(4) cost uncertainty: the actual individual costs burden if the policy is implemented could 
be above or below their true WTP for the policy. 
Concerning element (2), Baron (1996, p. 155) suggests how this can be implemented in a 
survey: “Specifically, we can [the respondents] that their WTP will be compared to their fair 
share of the cost of the good. If more than half of the respondents are willing to pay at least their 
fair share, then the good will be provided, and otherwise it will not”. Concerning element (4), If 
this is not the case, then the set of payoff-maximizing responses in the majority-rule format may 
comprise an entire range of bid amounts (Green et al. 1998, p. 92). Although there are then no 
strategic gains to be made, the question is not incentive compatible, since the respondent can 
state any WTP that lies within the set of payoff-maximizing responses. 
However, incentive compatibility of preference elicitation in surveys cannot be defined 
without taking into account whether the respondents accept the posited choice framework. The 
                                                 
2 One could also use the term „theoretically demand revealing“. We use TIC to remain close to the terminology used 
by Green et al. 
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 additional requirement for a preference elicitation to be incentive compatible (IC) is that the 
respondent accepts this frame. In other words, to accomplish an incentive compatible elicitation, 
the surveyor must persuade the (rational) respondents that their responses will be counted as a 
‘Yes’ if they exceed the individual share of the costs given a pre-specified (e.g. tax) schedule, 
that the probability of the implementation is linked to survey plurality (and not mean WTP) and 
that the respondents do not know if their share of the actual costs of the policy are above or 
below their WTP. Green et al. (1998) emphasize that a CV experiment can be set up to be what 
we call TIC regardless of the (open-ended vs. closed ended) question format. 
For experimental purposes, the specific merit of the TIC property is that it is a property of 
the survey protocol alone: A survey protocol is TIC if it contains explicit specifications to 
prompt beliefs (1)–(4) above. These specifications can be experimentally manipulated and their 
effects on WTP response assessed. Currently standard referendum CV survey protocols are not 
TIC. Indeed, to our knowledge, not a single CV study has used a TIC frame to date. Since the 
TIC frame can support the beliefs required to make an elicitation incentive compatible, an 
important empirical issue is therefore whether the TIC framing actually affects these beliefs and 
is successful in reducing strategic misrepresentation. If responses turn out to be sensitive to the 
theoretical incentive properties of the preference question, we must conclude that incentives do 
matter. Accordingly, the null hypothesis we test is that the TIC framing does not affect responses 
compared with standard non-TIC frames. 
In the present study, the beliefs concerning a decoupled payment vehicle (3) are not 
critical for strategic misrepresentation because, with the proposed public policy, a non-decoupled 
payment vehicle is hardly conceivable. In contrast, each of the specifications made to prompt 
beliefs (1), (2) and (4) may be hypothesized to influence the respondents’ perception of the 
linkages between response and policy outcome. We thus devise an experiment in which we 
manipulate specifically the information to prompt these beliefs (1), (2) and (4). We then examine 
6 
 the effects of these manipulations on stated beliefs and on strategic misrepresentation of WTP. In 
order to examine strategic misrepresentation in a public policy setting where “true” preferences 
are unknown, we pursue the following simple strategy. We conduct a survey to evaluate a nature 
conservation project among a sample of outdoor recreationists. We thus obtain a sample of 
respondents with a generally great demand for nature conservation policies relative to the entire 
population. Strategic overbidding should be particularly frequent among our respondent groups. 
We argue that any decrease of stated WTP due to a TIC framing could thus be quite plausibly 
interpreted as evidence for decreased strategic overbidding. 
 
 
3. Methods 
 
3.1. Experimental design 
 
We conducted two field surveys with outdoor recreationists, one in Germany and one in 
Switzerland. The valuation scenarios were structured around proposed species re-introduction 
programs. We used experimental design techniques to investigate individual and interactive 
effects of different pieces of information in the survey protocol which specify the relevant social 
choice framework. In a short section explaining the social choice context (preceding the 
valuation question) we factorially crossed three two-level treatment factors. The treatments were 
different versions of the information to prompt beliefs (1), (2) and (4): the decision rule (DR; 
majority vs. mean rule), the decisiveness of the survey (DV; emphasis vs. no special emphasis), 
and the extent of cost uncertainty of the project (CU; high vs. low) (Table 1). With each 
information treatment factor, we compare a non-TIC control treatment (coded 0) with a TIC 
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 treatment (coded 1; see Table 2). Apart from this section, the eight (23) questionnaire versions 
(treatment combinations) were identical. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
For a credible implementation of this experiment, the good to be valued had to fulfil a 
number of criteria: It had to be realistically provided by a public body, amenable to description 
in a written survey, of appropriate size to be funded by the study population, credibly provided 
through a tax mechanism, and of a nature where it may be credibly claimed that costs are 
unknown and yet to be determined. A hypothetical project to re-introduce the Eurasian otter 
(Lutra lutra L.) respectively in the Harz Region of Lower Saxony, Germany, or in the Canton of 
Zurich, Switzerland, fulfilled the above criteria. Otters are extinct in the Harz Region and in the 
canton of Zurich (and all over Switzerland). Since other attractive animals such as the lynx had 
been re-introduced in both areas in recent years, the otter project appeared to be a credible 
proposition. In fact, there had been discussions about such programs among NGOs in both study 
locations. 
 
3.2. Field sites 
 
As explained above, our goal was to obtain respondent samples that included a large proportion 
of individuals with a particularly supportive attitude towards our hypothetical project. This goal 
was pursued by conducting the survey among outdoor recreationists at field sites nearby nature 
reserves. Each survey was conducted in two field sites which were selected to sample slightly 
different segments of the ‘population’ of outdoor recreationists. 
The Harz National Park covers about 15’000 ha. There are several creeks and river 
systems suitable for a reintroduction in the lower parts of the mountain range, although the 
Region has also a high touristic potential. The field site ‘Oderbruck’ was a parking lot in the 
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 center of the National Park. It is a starting point for many walks in the area. The field site 
‘Torfhaus’ was a parking lot on top of the Torfhaus Mountain surrounded by various restaurants 
and small kiosks. The mountain is one of the main tourist attractions in the Harz. It is famous for 
its views to the Brocken which is the highest elevation of the Harz. 
The canton of Zurich has several smaller nature reserves in which a re-introduction of the 
otter could be feasible, including the Sihlwald near Zurich’s Uetliberg mountain and the 
protected areas of the Greifensee lake. The field site ‘Uetliberg’ was the terrace (with a 
restaurant and playground) on top of the Uetliberg. The place can be reached by train plus a ten 
minute walk, and is a starting point for walks. The field site ‘Greifensee’ was a passenger-boat 
landing near the city of Uster. The shoreline is a popular outdoor recreation and hiking area. 
The rationale for conducting the survey in both Germany and Switzerland is that 
institutional differences may influence the perception of the framing. In particular, Swiss 
respondents are habituated to voting about regional (cantonal) policy issues. On one hand, this 
might increase the plausibility of the voting scenario. On the other hand, given that constitutional 
provisions allow actual referendum decisions, the Swiss citizens might be less inclined to 
perceive surveys as a valid and credible instrument to inform public policy. While it is difficult 
to predict how the institutional and cultural differences might affect the perception and effects of 
alternative frames, conducting the study both in Germany and in Switzerland would provide an 
indication of whether any observed effects may be sensitive to the cultural and institutional 
setting. 
 
3.3. Survey procedures 
 
Recreationists aged 18 and over, were intercepted by field assistants (students and PhD students 
carrying a tag with name and university affiliation) who gave a short description of the survey. 
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 Volunteers then immediately completed a written questionnaire at standing-tables provided for 
this purpose (in the Harz study, writing pads were additionally offered). On the tables, a small 
brochure with additional information about the biology and ecology of the otter was available for 
interested respondents. The interviewers were present at all times and ensured that questionnaires 
were completed independently by each respondent. Ballot boxes were put up to ensure 
anonymity of the completed questionnaires. As a way to express our appreciation and also to 
increase participation we offered a beverage coupon from a nearby restaurant or kiosk to each 
volunteer completing the questionnaire. Social norms and procedural benefits have been found to 
play an important role in motivating carefully considered survey responses (Hidano et al. 2005a, 
b). Specifically, we expected that the explicit university affiliation of the surveyors should 
activate feelings of duty to carefully complete the survey. With the beverage coupons, we aimed 
at supporting a generally favourable perception of the survey process. 
 The Zurich surveys were conducted in a period of nice weather on the 10th to 13th 
(Greifensee) and on the 14th to 17th (Uetliberg) of October 2003 on weekday afternoons and on 
a Saturday. The Harz surveys were completed on a single weekend (18th and19th of October) in 
both field sites simultaneously. A second sampling on the following weekend had to be 
terminated unsuccessfully because of bad weather. Increasingly low temperatures thereafter 
prevented us from reaching our target of 220 responses for each field site of the Harz 
experiment. 
 
3.4. Questionnaire 
 
The survey included four sections: Section one provided background information about the 
species, its local extinction history, and its habitat requirements with regard to a possible re-
10 
 introduction. In section 2 the respondents were first asked about their attitude concerning an 
increase or decrease of the state (cantonal) expenditures for nature conservation:  
“Should [the canton of Zurich] [Lower Saxony] spend more or less tax money for nature protection?”  
Response options were “more”, “somewhat more”, “the same amount as today”, “somewhat 
less”, “less” and “don’t know”. Furthermore, they were asked whether they would welcome a 
small local population of otters if these could be re-introduced without any additional nature 
protection measures. 
The following text, comprising the open-ended WTP question, was:  
 
“In view of the costs of re-introducing the otter we now ask you if you would be prepared to back this 
nature conservation project with tax money. 3 Consider that this money would then be unavailable for other 
purposes! Please consider also the following items: 
• The project would be realized through the [state of Lower Saxony (State Office for Ecology)][Canton 
of Zurich (Office of Landscape and Nature)] and would have a direct impact on your personal tax bill. 
• (treatment factor CU; Table 2, first row) 
• (treatment factor DR; Table 2, second row) 
• (treatment factor DV; Table 2, third row) 
Up to which amount of personal additional taxes (state income and property taxes) would you be prepared 
to vote for a successful re-introduction program [in a cantonal referendum]? (Note: if you are married and 
receive a joint tax bill, divide the amount by two.) .... [EURO] [Francs]. Please think and respond carefully 
and realistically!” 
Insert Table 2 about here 
                                                 
3 If an unequal distribution of costs, such as in an income tax schedule, is specified, then the majority-rule open-
ended format is not incentive compatible unless an additional assumption is made. This assumption is, in the case of 
an income tax vehicle, that respondents truthfully report their taxable income. In the present experiment, an income 
tax vehicle was the only credible option. Theoretical incentive compatibility of our majority-rule format therefore 
requires the assumption that respondents did not misreport their income. 
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 Section 3 asked five questions about socio-economic characteristics (gender, year of 
birth, education, type of job, and income. Finally, section 4 asked two “debriefing” questions 
about the respondents’ beliefs concerning the social choice context. The questions about beliefs 
allow to examine whether the information treatments were effective in manipulating those 
beliefs which, based on the theoretical results of Green et al. (1998), would be expected to 
determine the incentive compatibility of the elicitation. The questions were placed at the end of 
the questionnaire to minimise potential effects on the WTP responses (see Pouta 2004). In a first 
question, the respondents were asked about their perception of the decisiveness of the survey (see 
belief 1 and the treatment factor DV above): 
“How strongly do you agree with the following statement: ‘The results of this survey can have an impact on 
public policy’?” 
Answering options were from 1 for “fully agree” to 5 for “do not agree at all”. The second 
question concerned the issue of cost uncertainty and was devised to assess to what extent 
respondents were unsure whether the actual costs would be lower or higher than their WTP (see 
belief 4 above and the treatment factor CU in Table 2): 
“How strongly do you agree with the following statement: ‘I expect that it will be possible to re-introduce the 
otter at agreeable costs’?” 
Answering options were again from 1 for “fully agree” to 5 for “do not agree at all”. This last 
section also provided space for comments and offered a contact address for further information.  
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 4. Results 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
The Zurich and the Harz surveys yielded a total of 772 usable responses. Means of 
socioeconomic characteristics and response variables for the two survey locations are listed in 
Table 3. The responses to the attitude questions suggested that the Zurich respondents were on 
average more supportive of increased expenditures for conservation than the Harz respondents, 
and they also stated higher mean WTP for the proposed project (Table 3). The observed mean 
attitude value of about 4 suggests that the outdoor recreationist sample was strongly biased 
towards individuals with a generally positive attitude towards nature conservation policies, as 
required by our empirical strategy (see end of Section 2). The proportion of “zero WTP” 
responses was higher in the Harz sample. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
In the following, we first report the binary probit models of treatment, demographic and attitude 
effects on stated beliefs about the social choice context. We then present the treatment, 
demographic and attitude effects on stated WTP. The data from the two field sites (subsamples) 
of each location were pooled. A dummy variable for the subsamples did not affect the pattern of 
effects and was therefore dropped in the models presented below. 
 
4.2 Effects on stated beliefs 
 
The effects of the questionnaire treatments (majority vs. mean decision rule (DR), high vs. low 
cost uncertainty (CU), and emphasis vs. no emphasis of decisiveness (DV)) and of the 
covariables on stated beliefs about the social choice context were analyzed using binary probit 
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 models as implemented in the software package LIMDEP 7.0 (Greene 1998). We used a coding 
of the dependent variables CU_belief and DV_belief as defined in Table 3 (last two rows). 
The specifications of the social choice context as implemented in our treatments did not 
have any consistent effects on the respondents’ stated beliefs about this social choice context in 
the Zurich or in the Harz sample (Table 4). The statement concerning a high (vs. low) 
uncertainty about the actual costs of the project (treatment factor CU) did not increase perceived 
cost uncertainty (CU_belief). The statement concerning the decisiveness of the survey results 
(treatment factor DV) did not affect the stated beliefs about the survey decisiveness (DV_belief). 
In the Harz sample we found some significant associations of the respondents’ reported 
beliefs about the social choice context with their socioeconomic characteristics. Education was 
positively related to uncertainty about whether the project could be implemented at ‘agreeable’ 
costs and negatively to the perceived “decisiveness” of the survey results (Table 4). These effects 
suggest that the more educated individuals may be less inclined to accept a social choice context 
as posited in the survey. We did not have any clear expectations regarding the effects of age and 
income on the perceived decisiveness, which were positive in the Harz sample. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
4.3 Effects on stated willingness to pay 
 
Mean values of stated WTP for the eight versions of the survey questionnaire and the two 
locations are listed in Table 5. The theoretically incentive compatible version of the 
questionnaire (DR=majority, CU=high, DV=emphasized; see Table 4) yielded the highest mean 
WTP in the Zurich survey and one of the highest in the Harz survey, although standard 
deviations were also high with this questionnaire version. 
14 
 Insert Table 5 about here 
The effects of the framing treatments on stated WTP were analysed using ordinary least 
squares regression. Corresponding with our aim to analyze strategic overbidding, we excluded 
only very extreme outliers among the stated WTP values in the WTP regressions. In the Harz 
sample there were no bids above 500 Euro, and in the Zurich sample we deleted two 
observations above 2000 SFR (2500 and 5000). Following the standard procedure, observations 
with missing values in any of the variables of the model were excluded from the analysis, which 
resulted in the sample sizes given in the regression tables. Several alternative definitions of the 
WTP variable were applied: WTP as given by the respondents (with non-responses treated as 
“missings”); WTP with “missings” recoded to zeros (see e.g. Carson et al., 1998); log-
transformed WTP (after recoding zeros to 1’s); and finally log-transformed positive (non-zero) 
WTP values (to retain only those WTP responses which were potentially inflated due to strategic 
incentives). Log-transformation substantially improved the normality of the WTP distribution. 
Using these definitions of the dependent variable, we did not find a consistent pattern of 
treatment effects on stated willingness to pay (Tables 6 and 7). In other words, statements 
concerning the decision rule (DR), the degree of cost uncertainty (CU) and the “decisiveness” of 
the survey responses (DV) did not consistently affect the ways in which respondents answered 
the willingness to pay question. Only in one model (third model in Table 6) did we find some 
evidence for a (positive) main effect of the majority decision rule and of increased cost 
uncertainty on stated WTP, while the interaction of the two factors was negative. However, a 
similar effect is not found in any of the other WTP models of the Zurich dataset (Table 6). Some 
of the covariates for demographic characteristics and attitudes, however, were quite consistently 
related to the WTP responses. In particular, the coefficients on the covariables ‘income’ and 
‘attitude’ always had the expected signs and were significant in most models (Tables 6 and 7). 
15 
 Hence, the survey passed the – admittedly weak – internal validity criterion of a significant 
income effect which is frequently reported in contingent valuation surveys. 
 We also estimated models in which we fitted dummy variables for each questionnaire 
version, except for the theoretically incentive compatible (TIC) version (DR=majority, CU=high, 
DV=emphasized; see Table 4) which was the base case, to contrast each of these treatment 
combinations with the TIC version. In the Zurich dataset, the version 2, 3 and 6 yielded 
significantly lower stated WTP values both in models with and without the covariables. In the 
Harz dataset, however, none of the questionnaire versions yielded significantly different stated 
WTP than the TIC version, although the covariables for income and attitude were significant. 
Insert Tables 6 and 7 about here 
5. Discussion 
 
From the theoretical perspective of Green et al. (1998), the incentive compatibility of stated 
preference elicitations about public goods depends on whether the survey frame is successful in 
supporting a specific set of beliefs about the social choice context. One might therefore expect to 
find effects of information treatments aimed at supporting these beliefs on stated WTP for public 
goods. Contrary to this expectation, the present study found no consistent effects of such 
information treatments on either beliefs about the social choice context or on stated WTP values. 
This result suggests that individuals’ responses were quite immune to claims about the social 
choice context of which the respondents, after all, did not know whether or not they were true. 
Unfortunately, we cannot say whether this is because strategic issues were generally not 
important or whether our treatments were simply not successful in modifying the respondents’ 
perceptions of their strategic opportunities. The former would be likely if the respondents did not 
know their WTP with any precision or if only a minority of the respondents engaged in the kind 
of analytical thinking that would allow strategic behavior, as has been found in studies using 
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 verbal protocol methods (Schkade and Payne, 1994). The latter would be likely if the 
respondents did not “accept” the frames. A final possible reason for the immunity of responses 
would be, of course, that Green et al’s – compelling – proposition regarding incentive 
compatibility in CV surveys is incorrect. 
 Two problems of our empirical approach merit special attention. First, as noted by Green 
et al. (1998), it is conceivable that if subjects who accept some, but not all, of the information 
about the social choice context, the incentives for misrepresentation may be increased rather than 
reduced. However, as the theoretically incentive compatible (TIC) questionnaire version yielded 
the highest WTP responses, the pairwise comparisons of the responses to the TIC questionnaire 
version with the responses to each of the other questionnaire versions did not support this 
particular idea of Green and his co-authors. Second, it appeared to be difficult to provide the 
relatively complex information about the implementation rule (majority vs. mean rule) in an 
appropriate way. To characterize the majority rule we had to convey something like: “We are 
doing this survey so that once we will know the exact cost of the good, we can determine 
whether enough people would vote for the proposition” (see e.g. Baron, 1996, p. 153; Green et 
al., 1998, p. 90). From verbal protocol analyses it is well known that CV respondents do not 
always use the heuristics desired by the surveyors (e.g. Chilton & Hutchinson, 2003; Schkade 
and Payne 1994). Burton et al. (2003) who examined the effects of cost uncertainty in a 
laboratory referendum setting with induced preferences likewise found that cost uncertainty did 
not affect the choices in expected ways. We are not convinced that our respondents to the 
majority-rule format fully understood the consequences of this implementation rule for their 
strategic opportunities. More explicit explanations would perhaps be required to secure this 
understanding. 
 What directions could future research take, given the identified challenges in 
investigating incentive properties in field surveys on tax-financed public goods? Targeted verbal 
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 protocol analysis may be one promising avenue. However, as suggested by Green et al. (1998), 
strategic issues may be a relatively minor problem with respondents who do not even know 
themselves which response would be in line with their interests and values. The first step would 
thus be to devise new survey approaches which assist the respondents in reliably “constructing” 
their preferences in spite of cognitive limitations. Such an approach, involving the provision of 
“voter recommendations” from familiar parties and interest groups, has recently been proposed 
by Schläpfer and Schmitt (in revision). Once the respondents “know” their true preference 
responses, preventing strategic responses should be expected to become a main unresolved issue. 
Experimental manipulations of the survey frame in the spirit of Green et al. (1998) and the 
present experiment may then yield more conclusive results about the potential merits of a 
theoretically incentive compatible framing of preference questions. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
From the failure of our treatments to consistently affect stated beliefs about the social choice 
context and stated willingness to pay we conclude that the potential for reducing strategic 
behavior through theoretically incentive compatible survey protocols may be very limited. Our 
results are consonant with the conclusion of Green et al. (1998) who find that problems 
following from cognitive limitations of survey respondents may deserve more attention than the 
incentive properties of survey questions. Nevertheless, the incentive properties of stated 
preference elicitation for public goods remain a key unresolved issue in the theoretical 
underpinnings of stated preference methods. The present study represents one of the first 
empirical attempts towards its clarification. As such, it also highlights the empirical difficulties 
involved in investigating the role of incentive properties in preference questions about 
18 
 collectively provided public goods. Further empirical research is needed to understand the 
factors that drive the perception of the social choice context and how this perception may 
determine the incentive properties of stated preference questions about public goods and 
services. Sharper tests and more conclusive results than those presented here may be sought in 
the context of novel survey approaches in which the more fundamental problem that respondents 
may not even know their true preferences with any precision is resolved in a satisfactory way. 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
We thank George Hutchinson, Ricardo Scarpa, Jonathan Baron and two anonymous reviewers 
for very valuable comments on previous versions of this manuscript. Financial support was 
provided by the University of Zurich (Research Grant 57230101 to F. Schläpfer). 
19 
 References 
 
Andreoni, J., 1988. Why free ride? Strategies and learning in public goods experiments. Journal 
of Public Economics 37 (3), 291−304. 
Andreoni, J., McGuire, M.C., 1993. Identifying the free riders: a simple algorithm for 
determining who will contribute to a public good. Journal of Public Economics 51 (3), 
447−454. 
Arrow, K.R., Portney, P.R. Leamer, E.E., Radner, R., Schuman, H., Solow, R., 1993. Report of 
the NOAA panel on contingent valuation. Federal Register 58 (10), 4601−4614. 
Baron, J., 1996. Rationality and invanriance: Response to Schuman. In Bjornstad, D.J., Kahn, 
J.R. (Eds.), The Contingent Valuation of Environmental Resources. Methodological Issues 
and Research Needs. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, U.K, pp.145−163. 
Brown, T.C., Champ, P.A., Bishop, R.C., McCollum, D.W., 1998. Which response format 
reveals the truth about donations to a public good? Land Economics 72 (2), 152−166. 
Burton, A.C., Carson, K.S., Chilton, S.M., Hutchinson, W.G., 2003. An experimental 
investigation of explanations for inconsistencies to second offers in double referenda. Journal 
of Environmental Economics and Management 36 (3), 472−489. 
Carson, R.T., Hanemann, W.M., Kopp, R.J., Krosnick, J.A., Mitchell, R.C., Presser, S., 1998. 
Referendum design and contingent valuation: the NOAA panel’s no-vote recommendation. 
Review of Economics and Statistics 80 (3), 484−487. 
Carson, R.T., Groves, T., Machina, M., 2000. Incentive and informational properties of 
preference questions. Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of California, 
San Diego, CA. 
Champ, P.A., Flores, N.E., Brown, T.C., Chivers, J., 2002. Contingent valuation and incentives. 
Land Economics 78 (4), 591–604. 
20 
 Chilton, S.M., Hutchinson, W.G., 2003. A qualitative examination of how respondents in a 
contingent valuation study rationalise their WTP responses to an increase in the quantity of 
the environmental good. Journal of Economic Psychology 24 (1), 65–75. 
Cummings, R., Elliott, S., Harrison, G.W., Murphy, J., 1997. Are hypothetical referenda 
incentive compatible? Journal of Political Economy, 105 (3), 609–621. 
Cummings, R.G., Harrison, G., Rutström, E.E., 1995. Homegrown values and hypothetical 
surveys: Is the dichotomous choice approach incentive compatible? American Economic 
Review 85 (1), 260–266. 
Diamond, P.A., Hausman, J.A., 1994. Contingent valuation: is some number better than no 
number? Journal of Economic Perspectives 8 (4), 45–64. 
Fisher, A.C., 1996. The conceptual underpinnings of the contingent valuation method. In: 
Bjornstad, D.J., Kahn, J.R., The Contingent Valuation of Environmental Resources. 
Methodological Issues and Research Needs. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, pp. 19–37. 
Green, D., Jacowitz, K.E., Kahneman, D., McFadden, D., 1998. Referendum contigent valuation, 
anchoring, and willingness to pay for public goods. Resource and Energy Economics 20 (2), 
85−116. 
Greene, W. (1998). LIMDEP Version 7.0. User’s Manual. Econometrics Software Inc., 
Plainview, NY. 
Hidano, N., Kato, T, Izumi, K., 2005a. Reciprocity, consequentiality and willingness-to-pay in 
contingent valuation: an experimental panel analysis on climate changes. Paper presented at 
the 14th Annual Conference of the European Association of Environmental and Resource 
Economists, Budapest, Hungary. 
Hidano, N., Kato, T, Aritomi, M., 2005b. Benefits of participating in contingent valuation mail 
surveys and their effects on respondent behavior: a panel analysis. Ecological Economics 52 
(1), 63-80. 
21 
 Hoehn, J., Randall, A., 1987. A satisfactory benefit-cost indicator for contingent valuation. 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 17 (3), 226–247. 
Horowitz, J.K., McConnell, K.E., 2002. A review of WTA/WTP studies. Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 44 (3), 426–447. 
Loomis, J.B., Blair, L.S., Gonzalez-Caban, A., 2002. Language-related differences in a 
contingent valuation study: English versus Spanish. American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 84 (4), 1091–1102. 
Mitchell, R.C., Carson, R.T., 1989. Using Surveys to Value Public Goods: The Contingent 
Valuation Method. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. 
Pouta, E., 2004. Attitude and belief questions as a source of context effect in a contingent 
valuation survey. Journal of Economic Psychology, 25 (2) 229–242. 
Posovac, S. S., 1998. Strategic overbidding in contingent valuation: Stated economic value of 
public goods varies according to consumers expectations of funding source. Journal of 
Economic Psychology 19 (2), 205–214. 
Riera, P., 2003. Incentive compatibility in stated preference valuation methods: some positive 
results. Paper presented at the 12th Annual Conference of the Association of Environmental 
and Resource Economists, Bilbao, Spain. 
Schkade, D.A., Payne, J.W. 1994. How people respond to contingent valuation questions: a 
verbal protocol analysis of willingness-to-pay for an environmental regulation. Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 26 (1), 88–109. 
Schläpfer, F., Schmitt, M. Anchors, endorsements, and preferences: a field experiment. Resource 
and Energy Economics, in revision. 
Smith, V., 1979. An experimental comparison of three public good decision mechanisms. 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 81,198–215. 
22 
 Taylor, L.O., McKee, M., Laury, S.K., Cummings, R.G., 2001. Induced-value tests of the 
referendum voting mechanism. Economics Letters 71 (1), 61–65. 
23 
 Table 1. Experimental design 
Decision rule 
(DR) 
Cost uncer-
tainty (CU) 
Decisiveness 
(DV) Harz Zurich 
majority rule high emphasized 41 58 
  no emphasis 40 60 
 low emphasized 45 60 
  no emphasis 34 55 
mean rule high emphasized 36 58 
  no emphasis 40 58 
 low emphasized 39 54 
  no emphasis 38 56 
Note: Numbers in treatment cells are sample sizes (usable responses). 
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 Table 2. Levels (wording) of the three information treatment factors “survey decisiveness” (DV), 
“decision rule” (DR) and “cost uncertainty” (CU) 
Factor Control TIC-treatment 
CU cost uncertainty low (CU=0): 
“The costs of the measures for the re-
introduction are presently only 
approximately known. Depending on 
the results of precursory assessments 
they could be higher or lower. The 
project would increase the expenditures 
of [lower Saxony/the canton of Zurich] 
for nature conservation by an expected 
10 to 20 percent during one year.” 
cost uncertainty high (CU=1): 
“The costs of the measures for the re-
introduction are not yet known. 
Depending on the results of precursory 
assessments they could be relatively low 
or quite high. The project would increase 
the expenditures of [lower Saxony/the 
canton of Zurich] for nature conservation 
by between between 1 and 50 percent 
during one year.” 
DR Mean rule (DR=0): 
“The results of this survey will be used 
to estimate if the people’s joint 
willingness to pay is higher or lower 
than the costs (which are yet to be 
determined).” 
Majority rule (DR=1): 
“The results of this survey will only be 
used to assess, if a majority of the 
citizens would approve of the project. 
Every person has 1 vote. You cannot 
overproportionately influence the result 
by overstating or understating your 
willingness to pay” 
DV no emphasis on decisiveness (DV=0): 
[no information] 
emphasis on decisiveness (DV=1): 
“The results of this survey can have 
some influence on whether the re-
intorduction of the otter will be further 
pursued and realized by the public 
institutions.”  
Note: Words printed in bold only in this table (not in the original questionnaire). 
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 Table 3. Means of socioeconomic characteristics and response variables for each sub-
sample of the two survey locationsa 
  Location 
 Harz Zurich Variable 
name Description Oderbruck Torfhaus Greifensee Uetliberg 
nobs Sample size 159 154 221 238
income 2.30 2.35 3.14 2.85
 (1.14) (1.20) (1.32) (1.42)
 
Categorical variable: Harz: 
1=0-1000; 2=1001-2000; ...6= 
>5000 Euros. Zurich: 1=0-
2000; 2=2001-4000; ...6= 
>10000 SFR 
141 139 205 215
female 0.42 0.39 0.51 0.61
 (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49)
 
Binary variable: 1=female; 
0=male 
159 153 220 238
age 45.94 46.44 47.23 37.61
 (12.80) (13.21) (16.15) (18.15)
 
Age in years 
157 151 217 238
education 3.18 2.96 2.97 2.95
 (1.48) (1.53) (1.36) (1.29)
 
Highest educational degree: 
ranging from 1= mandatory 
schooling to 5= university 
degree 
154 148 215 235
attitude 3.86 3.86 4.07 4.12
 (0.82) (0.95) (0.93) (0.83)
 
Opinion about public 
expenditures for nature 
conservation (see methods): 
ranging from 1=should spend 
less to 5=should spend more 
146 126 214 223
wtp 25.92 30.70 132.23 93.29
 (37.32) (58.96) (433.25) (195.68)
 
Stated WTP in, respectively, 
Euro or SFR 
133 124 193 187
wtp0 21.68 24.72 115.48 73.30
 (35.44) (54.25) (407.14) (177.54)
 
Stated WTP in, respectively, 
Euro or SFR: item non-
response recoded to zero (see 
methods) 
159 154 221 238
CU_belief 0.58 0.56 0.47 0.49
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
 
Stated belief about cost 
uncertainty: 1 for response 
options 2-4; 0 otherwise b 159 154 221 238
DV_belief 0.55 0.49 0.57 0.59
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49)
 
Stated belief about 
decisiveness: 1 for response 
option 1 or 2; 0 otherwise b 159 154 221 238
a Standard deviations are in parentheses and number of observations in italics. 
b See text (Section 3.4). 
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Table 4. Binary probit models of the respondents’ stated beliefs about the social choice context 
 
 Dependent variable in the model 
 
CU_belief 
(Zurich)  
DV_belief 
(Zurich) 
CU_belief 
(Harz) 
DV_belief 
(Harz) 
Variable Coeff. t-ratio  Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio 
Constant -0.130 -0.403   0.370 1.133   0.486 1.154   -0.520 -1.219  
DECRULE (DR) 0.092 0.375   -0.198 -0.803   -0.668 -2.064**  0.392 1.208  
COSTUNC (CU) 0.062 0.249   -0.073 -0.292   -0.333 -1.082   -0.212 -0.685  
DECISIVE (DV) -0.405 -1.546   -0.351 -1.358   -0.133 -0.418   0.154 0.486  
CU×DR -0.205 -0.599   0.249 0.718   0.781 1.767 *  0.043 0.097  
CU×DV 0.284 0.789   0.460 1.281   0.307 0.682   0.224 0.495  
DR×DV 0.213 0.592   0.617 1.718 *  0.562 1.266   -0.380 -0.852  
CU×DR×DV 0.278 0.557   -0.789 -1.575   -0.910 -1.463   -0.036 -0.057  
age 0.002 0.614   0.005 1.358   -0.005 -0.871   0.013 1.974 ** 
gender -0.092 -0.704   -0.050 -0.381   -0.027 -0.165   0.102 0.612  
education 0.045 0.861   -0.059 -1.120   0.116 2.037**  -0.156 -2.701*** 
income -0.034 -0.674   -0.058 -1.155   -0.095 -1.253   0.171 2.181 ** 
Log-likelihood -281.7  -278.9 -183.3 -179.2 
Log-l. restricted -286.7  -283.7 -189.0 -188.5 
χ2 9.8  9.5 11.4 18.5 
Sig. level 0.55  0.57 0.41 0.07 
N 414  414 274 274 
***= significant at p<0.01; **= significant at p<0.05; *= significant at p<0.1. 
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Table 5. Means and standard deviations (SD) of stated willingness to pay (WTP) for the 8 
treatment combinations (questionnaire versions) 
Decision 
rule 
(DR) 
Cost 
uncertainty 
(CU) 
Decisiveness 
(DV) Zurich (values in SFR) Harz (values in Euro) 
   WTP 
WTP 
(missing=0) 
WTP WTP 
(missing=0) 
   Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
majority high emphasized 146 312 123 291 36 95 25 80 
  no emphasis 81 143 70 136 17 19 15 19 
 low emphasized 131 215 105 199 31 54 27 52 
  no emphasis 63 81 51 77 21 26 20 26 
mean high emphasized 63 58 53 58 19 28 13 25 
  no emphasis 91 224 81 213 27 32 22 31 
 low emphasized 75 65 61 65 36 47 29 45 
  no emphasis 101 242 73 211 36 51 34 50 
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 Table 6. OLS regression models of the WTP responses (Zurich dataset) 
 Dependent variable in the model 
 WTP  WTP (missing=0) logWTP (missing=0)  logWTP (only > 0)
Variable Coeff. t-ratio  Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio  Coeff. t-ratio 
Constant -27.677 -0.3276   -67.962 -0.9947  -1.151 -1.7407 *  1.485 2.585  
DECRULE (DR) -51.729 -1.1286   -18.145 -0.4865  0.669 1.8538 *  0.000 0.001  
COSTUNC (CU) -10.091 -0.2258   24.847 0.6564  0.815 2.2248 **  0.276 0.920  
DECISIVE (DV) -32.737 -0.6823   -7.405 -0.1882  0.600 1.5760   0.384 1.218  
CU×DR 21.581 0.3541   -16.192 -0.3105  -0.893 -1.7690 *  -0.293 -0.717  
CU×DV -12.837 -0.2027   -37.019 -0.6794  -0.469 -0.8891   -0.518 -1.230  
DR×DV 110.384 1.7203 *  75.452 1.3968  -0.323 -0.6170   0.068 0.161  
CU×DR×DV -0.339 -0.0039   31.630 0.4216  0.295 0.4065   0.241 0.417  
age 2.321 3.4290 ***  1.748 3.0520 *** 0.005 0.8193   0.016 3.456 *** 
gender 3.273 0.1448   1.830 0.0926  0.037 0.1954   -0.005 -0.030  
education -13.524 -1.5517   -9.502 -1.2212  0.064 0.8504   -0.059 -1.022  
income 11.107 1.2913 *  10.552 1.3912 ** 0.187 2.5426 **  0.181 3.137 *** 
attitude 10.978 0.8499   14.657 1.3404  0.657 6.2095 ***  0.268 2.925 *** 
R2 0.078  0.063 0.132  0.118 
N 336  393 393  318 
For significance levels see Table 5. 
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 Table 7. OLS Regression models of the WTP responses (Harz dataset) 
 Dependent variable in the model 
 WTP  WTP (missing=0) logWTP (missing=0)  logWTP (only > 0)
Variable Coeff. t-ratio  Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio  Coeff. t-ratio 
Constant -40.168 -1.4903   -28.581 -1.2300  0.344 0.451   1.153 1.340  
DECRULE (DR) -13.926 -0.9521   -13.948 -1.0287  -0.257 -0.577   -0.188 -0.410  
COSTUNC (CU) -9.147 -0.6109   -13.898 -1.0417  -0.466 -1.064   -0.163 -0.357  
DECISIVE (DV) 1.419 0.0944   -3.402 -0.2486  -0.258 -0.573   -0.021 -0.045  
CU×DR 2.473 0.1192   1.379 0.0744  -0.157 -0.258   -0.119 -0.185  
CU×DV -10.901 -0.4978   -9.447 -0.4962  -0.655 -1.047   0.066 0.094  
DR×DV 5.068 0.2516   6.094 0.3328  -0.115 -0.191   0.280 0.436  
CU×DR×DV 18.168 0.6152   16.715 0.6488  0.565 0.668   -0.432 -0.460  
age 0.377 1.2062   0.143 0.5600  -0.013 -1.526   0.020 1.953 * 
gender 5.238 0.6714   4.111 0.6061  0.179 0.801   -0.038 -0.156  
education -0.400 -0.1459   0.709 0.3045  0.076 0.997   -0.101 -1.173  
income 9.357 2.5758 **  9.117 2.9671 *** 0.265 2.625 ***  0.150 1.270  
attitude 10.018 2.3037 **  9.459 2.5473 ** 0.531 4.350 ***  0.242 1.670 * 
R2 adj. 0.089  0.091 0.149  0.085 
N 205  238 238  165 
For significance levels see Table 5. 
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